Surveillance technology is an integral part of the requirements for the camps on the Greek islands. Our partner organisation I Have Rights, together with the Border Violence Monitoring Network, has written an investigative research on surveillance technology in the CCAC Samos and its impact on the camp's residents.
This article serves as a summary of the report by the Samos-based human rights organization I Have Rights (IHR) and The Border Violence Monitoring Network (BWMN) on the impacts and risks of surveillance technology at the EU-Funded Samos Closed Control and Access Centre (CCAC). In the CCAC, people on the move are subjected to intrusive surveillance and collection of their personal data. In addition to data protection violations, the removal of people on the move’s phones and the implementation of multiple security systems in the CCAC, notably Centaur and Hyperion, are positioned to violate their fundamental rights. To investigate how surveillance and data collection take place in the Samos CCAC and to highlight the perspective of those who live, had lived, or work there, the NGO interviewed 59 people on the move as well as seven workers. In addition, IHR also conducted interviews with journalists, scholars, and other professionals.
PHONE REMOVAL
Over the years, it has become routine practice for the authorities to remove phones from people on the move immediately after their arrival on the island of Samos. After being prompted to address these acts, the authorities have produced conflicting statements on the matter. The Hellenic Police claim that “no mobile phones have been confiscated by police officers” and Frontex acknowledges the removal but insists that it is “prescribed in the operation plan”. This does not align with numerous accounts of people on the move, who have reported that they have experienced this practice.
The legal basis for this act is undetermined, as well as under scrutiny, as although the Fundamental Rights Monitor reported that the removal of phones is a part of the investigative process of unauthorized entry, the required procedure is not being undertaken. If this is the basis for the authorities' justification, the Hellenic Code of Criminal Procedure supports this as a lawful investigative procedure that supports the confiscation of belongings or digital data at a pre-trial stage. However, for this to be a valid lawful confiscation of phones, a clear procedure must be followed, which includes completing a written form, providing information to the suspect, and complying with basic legal principles. With a lack of evidence and countless testimonies from people on the move refuting that the procedure is being followed, it is doubtful that these standards are being met during the removal of devices.
A recent description in January 2025, by Solomon, supports this statement:
Three young Syrian asylum seekers interviewed in Samos said that their phones, as well as those of everyone they knew, had been seized by the authorities and returned later without explanation or any suspicion of them being involved in criminal activities. They were never told why their phones had been taken, did not sign any consent forms, and were not told when their devices might be returned.
As part of the report, 59 people on the move were interviewed on the topic of phone removal. Of these, 88% reported that their phone was removed upon arrival to Samos, and 58% of these also reported that they were required to share their passcode with the authorities.
“When we arrived, the first thing the police did was to take the phones away. When they took us to the camp they asked for the passcode [...] They write it on the back of the phone on a white sticker [...] My phone was dead but the others they checked their phones.”
Although all of these removed devices were returned by the Hellenic Police or CCAC “staff”, in many instances it was clear that the phones had been used and apps, such as photos, messages, and Google Drives accessed. This was determined and/or suspected by the device owners, as apps were open when the phone was returned, application managers indicated use during the removal period, or they directly witnessed the device being examined.
“They [the police] were really pushy, you could not say no. When they arrived they were screaming and giving orders, as if we were arrested.”
As almost everyone interviewed in the report had had their phone removed, this further exasperates the lack of legal basis authorities held, as it is highly unlikely that the phones were removed with specific suspicion, as is required by national and EU law. The interviews undertaken also indicate that the device owners did not consent to the removal and none of them were lawfully informed as to why they had their phones removed from them.
The removal of phones has increasingly become regular practice on Samos, with reports indicating that this became routine from at least December 2022. With the use of technology as a prominent method to identify, track, and control people on Samos, it is the removal of phones that many find to be the most invasive and upsetting practice.
After strenuous and traumatic journeys to the island, this practice indicated an abhorrent abuse of personal freedoms and privacy and hindered access to essential support. Following the phone removals, many of the interview respondents described feeling further fear, distress, and worry. This invasion of privacy is often referred to as a “digital strip search”, subjecting people to further prisoner-like treatment. Especially when there is little to no legal basis when this practice is enacted outside of lawful practice and procedure.
“We thought it was just how the process works, they have to search us, it is an obligation or a rule and that’s why we had to respect it, but of course I felt like a prisoner, I was thinking this is the punishment for having come illegally.”
In an already hellish environment, the removal of phones exasperates the intensity and displeasure of the prison-like facility and treatment, when people on the move are placed in de facto detention in the CCAC. It further isolates them, increases their vulnerability to human rights abuses, and limits their ability to gather or disseminate evidence or information of mistreatment.
It is suspected by IHR and BVMN that phones are being removed to extract data on people’s journeys to Samos, including routes, contacts, and other information. This poses a risk to the device owner but also to others whose information is stored on the devices.
As the report outlines, there are numerous ways that the authorities and Samos CCAC are utilising the implementation, or in this instance the removal of technology, to advance their control over people on the move. This “digital strip search” undermines their basic rights and their human dignity during an already extremely challenging time.
CENTAUR
The Centaur surveillance system collects image, video, and audio data through CCTV cameras installed throughout the CCAC, as well as aerial drones. At least three Greek companies (ESA Security, Space Hellas, Adaptit) and two Israeli companies (ViiSights and Octopus) are involved. The system is named after the mythological centaur – a half-human, half-horse creature symbolizing the duality of human intelligence and animalistic instincts (Algorithmwatch 2021).
Of the 59 people on the move interviewed, 57 (97%) reported the presence of CCTV cameras in the Samos CCAC, as did all seven workers. The Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum claims that there are no cameras in private areas such as accommodation units, leisure areas, or toilet facilities. While respondents confirmed this for the containers in which they are housed, they reported cameras in all other areas, including corridors and canteens, where overcrowding often forces people to sleep. 37 (63%) of those interviewed also reported having seen or heard surveillance drones, while only one worker did – suggesting drones are mainly deployed at night.
54 (92%) respondents of the people on the move stated they were not informed about CCTV surveillance and 50 (85%) reported not having seen a single sign indicating its presence. All seven workers confirmed this. Likewise, all those who had seen drones stated they had not been informed about their use. Both the Hellenic Data Protection Authority and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights have raised concerns about the lack of clear and accessible information regarding surveillance.
In response to the European Commission in 2022, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum referred to a “Declaration of Non-Objection to Disclosure” that individuals are required to sign. However, the interviews suggest that most people on the move as well as all workers were never given such information. The organization I Have Rights noticed that until mid-2023, this document did not mention surveillance at all; and since then, it has contained only a single vague sentence about CCTV, provided solely in Greek and English, using complex legal and technical terms. This insufficient and exclusionary notification raises concerns about illegal data processing in the CCAC.
Among the 57 respondents aware of CCTV, 26 (46%) felt safer due to the cameras, while 15 (26%) reported feeling nervous, stressed, or afraid. The rest were indifferent (17%) or had other responses. Regarding drones, 30% were indifferent, while 16% each reported feeling worried, upset, and/or scared, or watched.
Conclusively, the deployment of CCTV cameras and drones is precepted differently among the respondents, with some expressing feeling protected and others expressing their discomfort. However, given that respondents were interviewed on sensitive topics in a high-security environment with high levels of insecurity among the people on the move, biases like the social desirability bias or fear of reprisal cannot be ruled out regarding peoples’ responses – despite the interviews being anonymous. In this CCAC, CCTV surveillance creates a panoptic environment in which people on the move are in a “state of conscious and permanent visibility” (Foucault 1995: 201), leading to a deprivation of privacy which may lead to feelings of anxiety and loss of autonomy.
HYPERION
The Hyperion security system uses biometric data to control entry and exit from the CCAC. People on the move are subjected to a time-consuming process of scanning their fingerprints, as well as a biometric ID card, to enter and exit the facility. Both national and EU bodies, including the Greek Ombudsman and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, have criticised the use of invasive data processing with vulnerable groups such as asylum seekers.
Despite increasing concern over data privacy, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum has failed on multiple accounts to address data minimisation and transparency in its provision and utilisation of biometric data in the CCAC. Following the Hellenic Data Protection Authority’s decision which concluded the Ministry’s security goals can be achieved with more proportionate methods, such as identification cards, the governing body has yet to clearly communicate the legal basis and data subject rights related to biometric processing. Further, official statements from the Ministry have claimed that providing such data would not be a mandatory condition for accessing services, despite contradictory testimonies from former CCAC residents.
Testimonies from former residents and NGO workers at the CCAC expose important knowledge gaps between official Ministry statements and experiences on the ground. Despite GDPR mandates requiring data subjects to be informed why their personal data is collected and processed, as well as their rights, the study revealed that former residents felt they could not refuse to provide their fingerprints. Additionally, of the 59 people on the move interviewed, 42 (71%) reported they were not informed why they had to provide their fingerprints. Alternatively, this was not the case with NGO workers, all of whom refused to give their fingerprints and instead used their national (non-biometric) ID cards.
The processing of biometric data is positioned to become the norm in other reception facilities for people on the move, without addressing the principles of necessity and proportionality. While some residents saw data provision as a welcomed sacrifice for security, many others likened the experience to being in prison, with such procedures disrupting their daily lives at the CCAC.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, roughly a third (20; 34%) of the 59 people on the move interviewed stated that the technologies made them feel safe or had a positive impact while ten respondents (17%) expressed feeling imprisoned, surveilled, controlled, or having their privacy invaded. The other respondents were either unsure, could not answer the questions, or stated that the surveillance technology did not impact their stay. However, aforementioned biases such as social desirability or fear of reprisal could have influenced the responses. In contrast, all seven workers interviewed reported that the surveillance technologies did not make them feel safer but instead made them feel watched or controlled.
I Have Rights points out that the removal of phones, extensive data collection, the installment of cameras, and the use of drones all constitute potential violations of the right to privacy. The NGO’s research further indicates a lack of transparency and information on the surveillance technologies in the CCAC as well as the use of data. Additionally, the surveillance technologies used create an environment of discomfort or anxiety for many but not all respondents.
I Have Rights concludes its report with recommendations on 1) Transparency and Accountability, 2) Protection of Rights for People on the Move, and 3) Safeguards Against Discrimination.
Point 1) Includes clarifying the legal basis for the removal of phones, the public disclosure of details on Centaur and Hyperion, and the conduction and publication of detailed fundamental rights impact assessments for all high-risk technologies used in the CCAC.
Under point 2), IHR recommends stopping the praxis of phone removals, providing clear and accessible information to people on the move and workers about the surveillance technologies, including their purpose, legal basis, and data processing methods, and to replace the praxis of fingerprinting with less intrusive methods such as ID cards.
Finally, point 3) suggests ensuring that AI algorithms used for the technologies are free from bias and that assessment reports on the impact of these technologies on vulnerable populations should be published on a regular basis.
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